The Judge has spoken. But while his word may be final, the legal statute on which he correctly based his opinion appears to have a gaping hole in it. At least we non-lawyers think so.
But before we take issue with the statute, here are the facts about the case of Bichao versus 0' Shea and Kobitz.
Two weeks ago, Superior Court Judge John Triarsi dismissed stalking charges against Hillside Board of Education member John 0' Shea, and also denied a request by the attorney of the 17-year-old Sergio Bichao to place a restraining order on the board member.
O'Shea and the high school graduate found themselves battling in court because of an ugly confrontation that occurred at Hurden-Looker Elementary School on April 16, the day of the contentious Hillside school board election.
Bichao, who brought the stalking charges against O'Shea and Arthur Kobitz, a member of the Hillside Board of Health, said he feared for his life during the brief encounter with O'Shea, who he alleged pinned him to a wall and was screaming at him, Even before the Hurden-Looker encounter, the two had clashed earlier and exchanged words at the high school, where Bichao was also distributing campaign literature.
O'Shea admits he confronted Bichao at Hurden-Looker because he had received reports from several people at different polling stations that Bichao was harassing women and children. The 50-year old board member says he never laid his hands on or even touched Bichao, and adds that he purposely wrapped his hands behind his back.
Judge Triarsi, sitting in Elizabeth, believed the testimony of several witnesses who testified for Bichao. But in the end, he ruled that O'Shea's behavior was "within the norm" of what's expected during a heated election. Triarsi said 0' Shea's behavior did not meet the criteria needed to charge a person with stalking. The statute, Triarsi explained, requires a person to commit or be involved in at least two acts of harassment before they can be found guilty of stalking.
"O'Shea did not have a second act," the judge clearly stated, and adds that even his first act was merely an "oral incident."
Kobitz, the brother of school board President Dennis Kobitz, on the other hand, wasn't that lucky. He was found to have committed two acts of harassment against Bichao, and thus was slapped with a restraining order.
The statute on which the judge based his decisions required two incidents of harassment before a person could be found guilty of stalking. Kobitz had a second act and 0' Shea didn't, the judge says, so one got away and the other was toasted. Fair game!
But what does this really tell us? Does this statute really serve the cause of justice? No, it is a law we find somewhat flawed by the fact that determining when a "first" or "second" act occurs is open to ambiguity.
For example, it can be argued that O'Shea's encounter with Bichao outside the Hurden-Looker building was his "first" act. And then, his "second" act was when he chased Bichao into the school building and allegedly pinned him to the school wall.
The point is the statute does not state how many minutes, hours, or days should pass between a first and second act before it can be defined as stalking. Putting aside the case of 0' Shea, we believe this statute not only protects stalkers but also hurts victims, particularly abused women. It seems the message here is: you can do it once as long as you don't do it again.
A would-be psychotic killer can follow a victim all day and unless he repeats the act the next day, it wouldn't be considered stalking. Or would it?
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